Corn is everywhere!

I found this assignment incredibly challenging due to the fact that living on a tight budget often means I shop in advance and try (as best possible) to plan meals in advance. Therefore when I was at home I was limited to eating what I had already purchased, and as we all know, there is corn in pretty much everything in the U.S. I had no idea that everything from my sandwich to my pasta would be affected. So needless to say I did not succeed very well.

But I do eat at least once a day on campus. Here there is not the pre-planned problem, although I am limited to the food choices on campus that I can pay cash with, since I don't have a meal plan. Again most foods (that I would choose to eat from AU food services) have some element of corn in them. I try eating salads, but even the dressing has corn product in it. And basically anything from The Tavern is going to have corn in it (and I don't even eat their burgers).

Overall I was really surprised at how all encompassing corn is in the American diet, and in my opinion for seemingly no reason. Do we need corn in our tooth paste, salad dressing, or bread to make it taste good? I really don't think so. I begin to question what incentive does the food producing company have for adding just one more ingredient to their food, especially one that is so seemingly useless in terms of taste and quality. Although I failed at the NO corn for a week assignment, it was a great learning opportunity to see just what is inside American food products. Surprisingly corn is everywhere!

Amanda

There is corn in my beer???

This was pretty hard, seeing as how I already have to check food labels often for any meat product, and also just can't eat meat in general. But that is just with the food that I eat – not to mention the things I drank, the medication I took. I thought a lot about a good friend of mine who is allergice to peanuts, and how hard it must be to have to check labels of everything you eat, and how additionally hard it must be when your food is prepared for you, so you are never really sure of what it contains. And THEN, I started thinking about labels, and what is actually in food. A huge percentage of the list on the corn allergen website contains words that I've never heard of, ending in -ine, -ate, acid, etc. What is all this crap? Why is it in our food? How does corn end up in vanilla, or baking soda, or confectioner's sugar? It doesn't belong there!

This was a really hard challenge, nearly impossible, seeing as how even the cab that I drove home in had corn in it. But, it brought full circle everything that we've learned about the contemporary US food system. When we can really cash in on a commodity, like corn, we abuse it to the max. There isn't any reason for corn to be in everything we eat – its hardly a vegetable, and it has little nutritional value. But corporations can make a lot of money on it, and pump millions of dollars into aid campaigns about how high-fructose corn syrup is “just like sugar” (see http://www.sweetsurprise.com/) . Our food system has absolutely nothing to do with growing and selling food that humans need to live a healthy life. Just like every other aspect of our consumer society, it has become a way to make the consumer ignorant and encourage bad habits.

Food

When trying to decide what food to eat there a quite a few characteristics to consider. Besides the obvious nutritious factor, taste must also be considered. I try to eat as healthy as possibly and after living in Europe where there are more organic food options readily and cheaply available, I try to eat organic if possible. However, given my status as a college student, without a sizable income, it is not entirely realistic for me to be able to afford to buy organic food, even if I really would like to eat completely organic.

Of the foods I've eaten in the past few days, the foods worst for the environment would have to be something that is very processed, definitely not organic, that has chemicals added to it and is then produced in an environmentally damaging way. Processed foods such as fruit snacks or peanut butter, would probably be very environmentally damaging, along with such natural products like grains that are grown with excess chemicals which are environmentally harmful.

Amanda

Your Water Footprint

This is the link to the article I mentioned earlier about your "water footprint" from Good Magazine (which is a totally awesome magazine, btw):

http://www.good.is/?p=16356

FOOD

So, I’m a vegetarian, which means that food is always an issue for me. I have to be really picky about where I go out to eat, what I buy, etc. Before interning at the Greenpeace office last fall, I always thought that stores like Trader Joe’s and Whole Foods (health food stores) were the best places to shop as a vegetarian – plentiful amounts of meat substitutes and lots of alternative options. I started shopping at these places partly out of diet changes but also because I was concerned about the environment. But in researching the practices of grocery stores, even ones like Whole Foods, I’ve found that it is nearly impossible to shop at a supermarket that doesn’t inflict environmental harm in selling its products. So when I shop, I try to buy things that are a) vegetarian, b) remotely healthy/good for me and when I can afford it, making sure that it’s local. But it’s definitely hard to do all those things!
Thinking about what I’ve eaten in the past few days, the food that I would guess has had the greatest environmental impact would be eggs maybe? I eat eggs a lot because they are a good source of protein, and their cheap, but I found an article on water consumption, and it takes a ridiculous amount of water to produce eggs. Not to mention the land and food it takes to maintain chickens. Also, I had some strawberries this morning, and I bet that eating out of season fruit is also pretty bad for the environment because it takes shipping and resources that aren’t always readily available. For example, it has a way bigger impact to ship strawberries to D.C. from California in the middle of March when they are out of season, than from Maryland or Virginia in the middle of June when they are in season.

discussion question #6 - FOOD!

This was an interesting topic for me to consider for many reasons. Firstly, as a former athlete and the daughter of a fitness trainer, it would be safe to expect that i may have a lot of nutritional considerations when it comes to food; ironically, this is just the opposite, becuase in fact i eat fairly unhealthy.....

....on the other hand, it was also an interesting topic for me because last summer, i took an interesting seminar course, all about food. the predominate theme of the course, particularly seen with the semester long reading of Michael Pollan's book Omnivore's Dilemma. The book, among various food matters, examines the origins of food, the food production process (i mean literally, from hunting a deer or squeezing the egg from the chicken yourself!) to the paths our food takes to reach our plates, as well as animal rights questions. Since reading Dilemma, i certainly keep many of the considerations i took from it in mind when i am out eating. For example, i have a secret craving for McDonald's chicken mcnuggets and fries now and then - i wont fool myself and pretend that their are healthy, but, mcdonalds does something right if you look at the food labels which they give. But by Pollan's account, i am literally eating corn, corn corn (and maybe even some fake corn); the chickens were fed corn, then their meat was mixed with corn, which was coated in some corn and fried in some corn oil (and served to me with some corn and potato fries and some corn-syrup sweetened soda). now if this bothers some consumers, so be it, but it is how it is made. it is understanding the origins of the food though which allows a consumer, such as myself, to adjust the content of the rest of their daily diet to accomodate this corn intake. PLUS....I JUST LIKE NUGGETS SOMETIMES!

The second question of this weeks blog question is especially relevant for me actually, becuase in the past weekend i have encountered a few food situations where these exact issues came up! i was recently at a local deli/market, and i noticed that they had signage explaining how their fresh roasted chicken was not only hormone free, but also local sourced (driven in from maryland). upon further questioning it turns out the deli used the practice to cover many of their merchandise, such as the meats, vegetables, as well as dairy departments. this and my meal were interesting in the environmental impact concern because it covers some of the strongest aspects of the issue, the organic or non-chemically-altered element to the food, as well the distance factor, locally grown often being ideal becuase there is usually a high economic AND environmental cost associated with your pomegranates and grapes flying in from chile yesterday night. these such issues, when i have an active control over following them, are ones i highly agree with and try to stick to often. personally, i am not too too crazy about utterly non-natural means of say, getting my meat (feed-lots anyone? eww), and also, unless i am just dying for some raspberries one day, i try to shop and cook foods that are in season, locally grown, although ultimately, i will admit price is a MAJOR factor in some of my purchasing decisions.....

-amy

interesting report

hey guys, i was reviewing this report, the ATLANTIC COUNCIL'S GLOBAL TRENDS 2025, and i felt it had some interesting points which were relevant to our class as well. take a look - ENJOY!

http://www.acus.org/publication/global-trends-2025-transformed-world

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

November 20, 2008

Download Publication PDF

The international system—as constructed following the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. By 2025, the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries. Concurrent with the shift in power among nation-states, the relative power of various nonstate actors—including businesses, tribes, religious organizations, and criminal networks—is increasing. The players are changing, but so too are the scope and breadth of transnational issues important for continued global prosperity. Potentially slowing global economic growth; aging populations in the developed world; growing energy, food, and water constraints; and worries about climate change will limit and diminish what will still be an historically unprecedented age of prosperity.

Executive Summary

Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones. Despite the recent financial volatility—which could end up accelerating many ongoing trends—we do not believe that we are headed towards a complete breakdown of the international system—as occurred in 1914-1918 when an earlier phase of globalization came to a halt. But, the next 20 years of transition to a new system are fraught with risks. Strategic rivalries are most likely to revolve around trade, investments, and technological innovation and acquisition, but we cannot rule out a 19th century-like scenario of arms races, territorial expansion, and military rivalries.

This is a story with no clear outcome, as illustrated by a series of vignettes we use to map out divergent futures. Although the United States is likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained. At the same time, the extent to which other actors—both state and nonstate—will be willing or able to shoulder increased burdens is unclear. Policymakers and publics will have to cope with a growing demand for multilateral cooperation when the international system will be stressed by the incomplete transition from the old to a still forming new order.

Economic Growth Fueling Rise of Emerging Players
In terms of size, speed, and directional flow, the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way—roughly from West to East—is without precedent in modern history. This shift derives from two sources. First, increases in oil and commodity prices have generated windfall profits for the Gulf States and Russia. Second, lower costs combined with government policies have shifted the locus of manufacturing and some service industries to Asia.

Growth projections for Brazil, Russia, India, and China indicate they will collectively match the original G-7’s share of global GDP by 2040-2050. China is poised to have more impact on the world over the next 20 years than any other country. If current trends persist, by 2025 China will have the world’s second largest economy and will be a leading military power. It also could be the largest importer of natural resources and the biggest polluter. India probably will continue to enjoy relatively rapid economic growth and will strive for a multipolar world in which New Delhi is one of the poles. China and India must decide the extent to which they are willing and capable of playing increasing global roles and how each will relate to the other. Russia has the potential to be richer, more powerful, and more self-assured in 2025. If it invests in human capital, expands and diversifies its economy, and integrates with global markets, by 2025 Russia could boast a GDP approaching that of the UK and France. On the other hand, Russia could experience a significant decline if it fails to take these steps and oil and gas prices remain in the $50-70 per barrel range. No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia, and none is likely to match their individual global clout. We expect, however, to see the political and economic power of other countries—such as Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey—increase.

For the most part, China, India, and Russia are not following the Western liberal model for self-development but instead are using a different model, “state capitalism.” State capitalism is a loose term used to describe a system of economic management that gives a prominent role to the state. Other rising powers—South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore—also used state capitalism to develop their economies. However, the impact of China following this path is potentially much greater owing to its size and approach to “democratization.” Nevertheless, we remain optimistic about the long-term prospects for greater democratization, even though advances are likely to be slow and globalization is subjecting many recently democratized countries to increasing social and economic pressures with the potential to undermine liberal institutions.

Many other countries will fall further behind economically. Sub-Saharan Africa will remain the region most vulnerable to economic disruption, population stresses, civil conflict, and political instability. Despite increased global demand for commodities for which Sub-Saharan Africa will be a major supplier, local populations are unlikely to experience significant economic gain. Windfall profits arising from sustained increases in commodity prices might further entrench corrupt or otherwise ill-equipped governments in several regions, diminishing the prospects for democratic and market-based reforms. Although many of Latin America’s major countries will have become middle income powers by 2025, others, particularly those such as Venezuela and Bolivia which have embraced populist policies for a protracted period, will lag behind—and some, such as Haiti, will have become even poorer and less governable. Overall, Latin America will continue to lag behind Asia and other fast-growing areas in terms of economic competitiveness.

Asia, Africa, and Latin America will account for virtually all population growth over the next 20 years; less than 3 percent of the growth will occur in the West. Europe and Japan will continue to far outdistance the emerging powers of China and India in per capita wealth, but they will struggle to maintain robust growth rates because the size of their working-age populations will decrease. The US will be a partial exception to the aging of populations in the developed world because it will experience higher birth rates and more immigration. The number of migrants seeking to move from disadvantaged to relatively privileged countries is likely to increase.

The number of countries with youthful age structures in the current “arc of instability” is projected to decline by as much as 40 percent. Three of every four youth-bulge countries that remain will be located in Sub-Saharan Africa, nearly all of the remainder will be located in the core of the Middle East, scattered through southern and central Asia, and in the Pacific Islands.

New Transnational Agenda
Resource issues will gain prominence on the international agenda. Unprecedented global economic growth—positive in so many other regards—will continue to put pressure on a number of highly strategic resources, including energy, food, and water, and demand is projected to outstrip easily available supplies over the next decade or so. For example, non-OPEC liquid hydrocarbon production—crude oil, natural gas liquids, and unconventionals such as tar sands—will not grow commensurate with demand. Oil and gas production of many traditional energy producers already is declining. Elsewhere—in China, India, and Mexico—production has flattened. Countries capable of significantly expanding production will dwindle; oil and gas production will be concentrated in unstable areas. As a result of this and other factors, the world will be in the midst of a fundamental energy transition away from oil toward natural gas and coal and other alternatives.

The World Bank estimates that demand for food will rise by 50 percent by 2030, as a result of growing world population, rising affluence, and the shift to Western dietary preferences by a larger middle class. Lack of access to stable supplies of water is reaching critical proportions, particularly for agricultural purposes, and the problem will worsen because of rapid urbanization worldwide and the roughly 1.2 billion persons to be added over the next 20 years. Today, experts consider 21 countries, with a combined population of about 600 million, to be either cropland or freshwater scarce. Owing to continuing population growth, 36 countries, with about 1.4 billion people, are projected to fall into this category by 2025.

Climate change is expected to exacerbate resource scarcities. Although the impact of climate change will vary by region, a number of regions will begin to suffer harmful effects, particularly water scarcity and loss of agricultural production. Regional differences in agricultural production are likely to become more pronounced over time with declines disproportionately concentrated in developing countries, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Agricultural losses are expected to mount over time with substantial impacts forecast by most economists by late this century. For many developing countries, decreased agricultural output will be devastating because agriculture accounts for a large share of their economies and many of their citizens live close to subsistence levels.

New technologies could again provide solutions, such as viable alternatives to fossil fuels or means to overcome food and water constraints. However, all current technologies are inadequate for replacing the traditional energy architecture on the scale needed, and new energy technologies probably will not be commercially viable and widespread by 2025. The pace of technological innovation will be key. Even with a favorable policy and funding environment for biofuels, clean coal, or hydrogen, the transition to new fuels will be slow. Major technologies historically have had an “adoption lag.” In the energy sector, a recent study found that it takes an average of 25 years for a new production technology to become widely adopted.

Despite what are seen as long odds now, we cannot rule out the possibility of an energy transition by 2025 that would avoid the costs of an energy infrastructure overhaul. The greatest possibility for a relatively quick and inexpensive transition during the period comes from better renewable generation sources (photovoltaic and wind) and improvements in battery technology. With many of these technologies, the infrastructure cost hurdle for individual projects would be lower, enabling many small economic actors to develop their own energy transformation projects that directly serve their interests—e.g., stationary fuel cells powering homes and offices, recharging plug-in hybrid autos, and selling energy back to the grid. Also, energy conversion schemes—such as plans to generate hydrogen for automotive fuel cells from electricity in the homeowner’s garage—could avoid the need to develop complex hydrogen transportation infrastructure.

Prospects for Terrorism, Conflict, and Proliferation
Terrorism, proliferation, and conflict will remain key concerns even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Islamic terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others—motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become “martyrs”—will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives.

In the absence of employment opportunities and legal means for political expression, conditions will be ripe for disaffection, growing radicalism, and possible recruitment of youths into terrorist groups. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long-established groups—that inherit organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks—and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized. For those terrorist groups that are active in 2025, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. One of our greatest concerns continues to be that terrorist or other malevolent groups might acquire and employ biological agents, or less likely, a nuclear device, to create mass casualties.

Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, other countries’ worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear-weapons capable Iran. Episodes of low-intensity conflict taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established.

We believe ideological conflicts akin to the Cold War are unlikely to take root in a world in which most states will be preoccupied with the pragmatic challenges of globalization and shifting global power alignments. The force of ideology is likely to be strongest in the Muslim world—particularly the Arab core. In those countries that are likely to struggle with youth bulges and weak economic underpinnings—such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Yemen—the radical Salafi trend of Islam is likely to gain traction.

Types of conflict we have not seen for awhile—such as over resources—could reemerge. Perceptions of energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regimes. However, even actions short of war will have important geopolitical consequences. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water naval capabilities. The buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water becoming more scarce in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to become more difficult within and between states.

The risk of nuclear weapon use over the next 20 years, although remaining very low, is likely to be greater than it is today as a result of several converging trends. The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is generating concerns about the potential emergence of new nuclear weapon states and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups. Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers. The possibility of a future disruptive regime change or collapse occurring in a nuclear weapon state such as North Korea also continues to raise questions regarding the ability of weak states to control and secure their nuclear arsenals.

If nuclear weapons are used in the next 15-20 years, the international system will be shocked as it experiences immediate humanitarian, economic, and political-military repercussions. A future use of nuclear weapons probably would bring about significant geopolitical changes as some states would seek to establish or reinforce security alliances with existing nuclear powers and others would push for global nuclear disarmament.

A More Complex International System
The trend toward greater diffusion of authority and power that has been occurring for a couple decades is likely to accelerate because of the emergence of new global players, the worsening institutional deficit, potential expansion of regional blocs, and enhanced strength of nonstate actors and networks. The multiplicity of actors on the international scene could add strength—in terms of filling gaps left by aging post-World War II institutions—or further fragment the international system and incapacitate international cooperation. The diversity in type of actor raises the likelihood of fragmentation occurring over the next two decades, particularly given the wide array of transnational challenges facing the international community.

The rising BRIC powers are unlikely to challenge the international system as did Germany and Japan in the 19th and 20th centuries, but because of their growing geopolitical and economic clout, they will have a high degree of freedom to customize their political and economic policies rather than fully adopting Western norms. They also are likely to want to preserve their policy freedom to maneuver, allowing others to carry the primary burden for dealing with such issues as terrorism, climate change, proliferation, and energy security.

Existing multilateral institutions—which are large and cumbersome and were designed for a different geopolitical order—appear unlikely to have the capacity to adapt quickly to undertake new missions, accommodate changing memberships, and augment their resources.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—concentrating on specific issues—increasingly will be a part of the landscape, but NGO networks are likely to be limited in their ability to effect change in the absence of concerted efforts by multilateral institutions or governments. Efforts at greater inclusiveness—to reflect the emergence of the newer powers—may make it harder for international organizations to tackle transnational challenges. Respect for the dissenting views of member nations will continue to shape the agenda of organizations and limit the kinds of solutions that can be attempted.

Greater Asian regionalism—possible by 2025—would have global implications, sparking or reinforcing a trend toward three trade and financial clusters that could become quasi-blocs: North America, Europe, and East Asia. Establishment of such quasi-blocs would have implications for the ability to achieve future global World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. Regional clusters could compete in setting trans-regional product standards for information technology, biotech, nanotech, intellectual property rights, and other aspects of the “new economy.” On the other hand, an absence of regional cooperation in Asia could help spur competition among China, India, and Japan over resources such as energy.

Intrinsic to the growing complexity of the overlapping roles of state, institutions, and nonstate actors is the proliferation of political identities, which is leading to establishment of new networks and rediscovered communities. No one political identity is likely to be dominant in most societies by 2025. Religion-based networks may be quintessential issue networks and overall may play a more powerful role on many transnational issues such as the environment and inequalities than secular groupings.

The United States: Less Dominant Power
By 2025 the US will find itself as one of a number of important actors, albeit still the most powerful one, on the world stage. Even in the military realm, where the US will continue to possess considerable advantages in 2025, advances by others in science and technology, expanded adoption of irregular warfare tactics by both state and nonstate actors, proliferation of long-range precision weapons, and growing use of cyber warfare attacks increasingly will constrict US freedom of action. A more constrained US role has implications for others and the likelihood of new agenda issues being tackled effectively. Despite the recent rise in anti-Americanism, the US probably will continue to be seen as a much-needed regional balancer in the Middle East and Asia. The US will continue to be expected to play a significant role in using its military power to counter global terrorism. On newer security issues like climate change, US leadership will widely perceived as critical to leveraging competing and divisive views to find solutions. At the same time, the multiplicity of influential actors and distrust of vast power means less room for the US to call the shots without the support of strong partnerships. Developments in the rest of the world, including internal developments in a number of key states—particularly China and Russia—are also likely to be crucial determinants of US policy.

2025—What Kind of Future?
The above trends suggest major discontinuities, shocks, and surprises, which we highlight throughout the text. Examples include nuclear weapons use or a pandemic. In some cases, the surprise element is only a matter of timing: an energy transition, for example is inevitable; the only questions are when and how abruptly or smoothly such a transition occurs. An energy transition from one type of fuel (fossil fuels) to another (alternative) is an event that historically has only happened once a century at most with momentous consequences. The transition from wood to coal helped trigger industrialization. In this case, a transition—particularly an abrupt one—out of fossil fuels would have major repercussions for energy producers in the Middle East and Eurasia, potentially causing permanent decline of some states as global and regional powers.

Other discontinuities are less predictable. They are likely to result from an interaction of several trends and depend on the quality of leadership. We put uncertainties such as whether China or Russia becomes a democracy in this category. China’s growing middle class increases the chances but does not make such a development inevitable. Political pluralism seems less likely in Russia in the absence of economic diversification. Pressure from below may force the issue, or a leader might begin or enhance the democratization process to sustain the economy or spur economic growth. A sustained plunge in the price of oil and gas would alter the outlook and increase prospects for greater political and economic liberalization in Russia. If either country were to democratize, it would represent another wave of democratization with wide significance for many other developing states.

Also uncertain are the outcomes of demographic challenges facing Europe, Japan, and even Russia. In none of these cases does demography have to spell destiny with less regional and global power an inevitable outcome. Technology, the role of immigration, public health improvements, and laws encouraging greater female participation in the economy are some of the measures that could change the trajectory of current trends pointing toward less economic growth, increased social tensions, and possible decline.

Whether global institutions adapt and revive—another key uncertainty—also is a function of leadership. Current trends suggest a dispersion of power and authority will create a global governance deficit. Reversing those trend lines would require strong leadership in the international community by a number of powers, including the emerging ones.

Some uncertainties would have greater consequences—should they occur—than would others. In this work, we emphasize the overall potential for greater conflict—some forms of which could threaten globalization. We put WMD terrorism and a Middle East nuclear arms race in this category. The key uncertainties and possible impacts are discussed in the text and summarized in the textbox on page vii on relative certainties. In the four fictionalized scenarios, we have highlighted new challenges that could emerge as a result of the ongoing global transformation. They present new situations, dilemmas, or predicaments that represent departures from recent developments. As a set, they do not cover all possible futures. None of these is inevitable or even necessarily likely; but, as with many other uncertainties, the scenarios are potential game-changers.

• In A World Without the West, the new powers supplant the West as the leaders on the world stage.

• October Surprise illustrates the impact of inattention to global climate change; unexpected major impacts narrow the world’s range of options.

• In BRICs’ Bust-Up, disputes over vital resources emerge as a source of conflict between major powers—in this case two emerging heavyweights—India and China.

• In Politics is Not Always Local, nonstate networks emerge to set the international agenda on the environment, eclipsing governments.

GLOBAL TRENDS 2025 SERIES:

• Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World
• NIC Chairman Thomas Fingar Presents "Global Trends 2025"
• Predicting the Future is Hard - And Necessary – James Joyner
• U.S. Dominance Ending – James Joyner
• Terrorism Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? – James Joyner
• Asia's Ascendency Seen in Intelligence Forecast – Joseph Snyder
• Climate Change Will be More Severe in 2025 –Erica McCarthy
• Economic Rise of the East – James O'Connor

Midterm Study Guide Cont'd....

Global Environmental Politics--examines the relationship between global political forces and environmental change, with particular attention given to the implications of local-global interactions for environmental management as well as the implications of environmental change for world politics.

Nitrogen cycle—transformation of nitrogen in nature. Nitrogen in atmosphere is used in soil with bacteria and then used by plants and animals. (not a great definition, but a simple understanding. I'm not a science person so this is my basic understanding of it)

Pollution--the introduction of contaminants into an environment that causes instability, disorder, harm or discomfort to the ecosystem.

Cornucopian—amount of creativity in ppl will save the world so humans will always find a solution. People are the best resource. (This is the same as Promethean, I believe.)

Precautionary principle—even if we don’t know all the science but there’s a danger we should be cautious, and create binding legislation. Better to be safe than sorry. Used for the CFC legislation deals.

I don't have a ton of ideas for the sustainable development either, I'm planning on looking over some of the reading. I would be good for a study group tomorrow night. I'm free after 8pm.

Amanda

Weedy species: plants, animals, and other organisms that thrive in continually disturbed, human-dominated environments. They are adaptive, and will flourish in a world where only the human species survives, so much to the point that we often deem them “pests”. For example: raccoons, milfoil, rats, the white-tailed deer. Significant to global environmental politics because author Stephen Meyer says these are the only animals that have any chance of surviving if we continue on the same path of destruction.

relic species: organisms that live on the margins in ever-decreasing numbers and contracting spacial distribution. They do not thrive in human-dominated environments, and have largely survived through benign neglect. Meyer says, “little on Earth is remote anymore” and human pressures are threatening these relic species. For example: African elephant, the giant panda. Significant to global environmental politics because these animals have no hope of survival if we continue on the same path of environmental degradation, and often we will never recognize that the species is a relic until it is too late, says Meyer.

extinction debt: With a high number of extinction, you have a debt that is represented – a future ecological cost of current habitat destruction. Many decades can pass between the start of the decline of a species and the observable collapse of a population structure, especially where moderate-to-long-lived life forms are involved. There is a “debt” or a gap between appearance and reality. In the past century we have accumulated a vast extinction debt that will be paid in the century ahead. The number of plants and animals we discover to be threatened will spiral as the extinction debt comes due. Significant to global environmental politics because it represents the costs of not taking action to prevent the environment, and also what our future may include if we chose not to act.

Here are the things that I'm a little unsure of so far, if anyone could help!
- A good definition for:
Global environmental politics
nitrogen cycle
pollution
Promethean???
precautionary principle
-How are people thinking about tackling the short answer question on sustainable development? I feel like we didn't really talk about it enough to be able to answer a whole question..Any ideas?

Also, if anyone wants to get together on Monday night to review I would be down for that...

Midterm Study Guide

I was working on my midterm study guide today and couldn't find a few of the vocab words in my notes and was wondering if anyone else had the definitions.

Weedy Species
Relic Species
Extinction Debt

Thanks!

Amanda

Will Technology Save Us?

I think technology certainly is a positive force in our lives, one that without which much of humanity would be radically different. Specifically in terms of the environmental crisis, I believe we have the technology but not the ideology. I view the saving powers of technology the same way as any other force preventing us from resolving the climate crisis – we have the tools and capabilities, however our past trends have paved the way for the future, and technology has come to represent things like faster computers. This is a sign of habit; out of habit, we consume and spend, and out of habit we use technology for personal pleasure, when really the capabilities are far more reaching.

I don't think technology can “save” us, but the ability to transfer solar power and wind power into energy didn't become a plausible solution until the technology behind it was researched. The great thing about the environmental movement is that it has the support of science behind it, which means that the ability to apply that knowledge to technology is very simple. I'm not completely optimistic about any solutions to the climate crisis – but I think technology is certainly a major force for change.

Technology

Technology has its benefits. Innovation and invention have been the driving forces in creating a lot of change in the past hundred years. Not all of that technological change has been good, in fact many argue that most of the ecological harm created in the past century has been due to the technological advances. Paul Ehrlich and John Holdren, the creators of the I=PAT equation, were not believers in the benefits of technology, pointing to all the harm caused by technology throughout the past decades.

While I tend to be more of a cynical person, for some reason I have this uncanny ability to be hopeful about technology "saving us" from our environmental harm. Since humans are so innovative and creative, I can only imagine that the human mind can be put to some good use, and be able to come up with some creative solutions to environmental issues. While I do not expect a miracle or a solution which will take away the century of destructive environmental human behavior, I do believe (or maybe hope) that technology may help solve some of the environmental issues currently facing our world today.

I do not believe that technology can necessarily "save us". Technology can help prevent further problems and additional harm caused to the environment, and perhaps come up with some creative solutions to problems already harming the earth. Unfortunately nothing can fix the immense amount of damage humans have already done to the environment, and therefore technology will not be able to "save us", as many environmental problems are so beyond repair that they will directly affect future generations. Hopefully technology will be able to help improve the lives of our grandchildren while still maintaining the environment.

Amanda

Discussion Question #5

Hmm....will technology save us? i think that in some ways, technology has proven to be both the cause and solution to many of the world's problems (use your imagination). I like to think that technologies can be grouped into adaptive technologies and convenience technologies (some both...but work with me here..). I think that depending how you assess which way to characterize a technology, has an impact on whether a technology is "good" or "bad", whether it will save us or not. While this assumption would technically apply to any technology, for the sake of our class lets make an environmental example --- FISHING: a convenience technology of the fishing industry is how commercial fisheries have developed net systems which allow them to trawl long stretches (of nets) and keeping them cast till as long as it takes to fill them. This is not a technology that will save us becuase although it is highly efficient and cost-effective for fisherman, it may result in overfishing, species extinction and loss of biodiversity for everyone else. On the other hand, i consider an adaptive technology for this industry to be the adoption of net systems which target the intended species of marine life to be caught; that is, there are nets which (and i am unclear how) but manage to allow species like dolphins and crustaceans to escape from the nets while keeping more intended fishing targets. the results of this would be quite the opposite from the first example....biodiversity has the opportunity to be preserved! As well, depending how you look at alternative fuel source arguements, you may see how some portray the arguements of decreasing dependency on fossil fuels, but others argue that dependence on ethanol would result in destroying good, natural agriculture soil. I guess...it's just how you look at costs and benefits, gains and losses from any respective eco-technology.

Also on the note of stratospheric ozone depletion, i assessed from our reading that the ozone-depleting chemicals which are in controversy on to the environmental community are again ones which fit into that characterization of making our lives easier (at an efficient or inexpensive cost); from the Global North's past use to the South's necessity to do the same now, there are certainly conflicts in place - for the North, how do you come to terms with harming the environment? do you change it? do you FIX it? do you find a way to do what you need to to, without harming the environment? ETC. with the South, how do you reconcile your opportunities to have the same abilities or achievement as the North? i think that there are conflicts of interest on many different levels here, and it is whether good or bad choices are made in response that will decide whether world society will be saved from environmental destruction or not -- that we need to all cooperate is a major necessity.